技术的青春期(下):经济冲击与人类的考验|达里奥·阿莫代伊 · 中英对照节译

2026-11-19
LZN

书童按:本篇是达里奥·阿莫代伊(Dario Amodei)2026年1月发表的《技术的青春期》(The Adolescence of Technology)一文的下篇。阿莫代伊是 Anthropic 的联合创始人兼首席执行官。本篇从农业机械化的历史谈起,考察劳动者能否跟上 AI 带来的职业变化,以及新财富会集中在谁手里。末章回到一个更难的问题:即使解决了眼前的风险,我们又该如何面对技术进步的意外后果?译稿由 Luna 初译,经 DeepSeek 与 Qwen 交叉校审,以飨诸君。

英文原文 · The Adolescence of Technology | 原文版权归原权利人所有。本中英文对照翻译稿件,仅作为交流学习之用。

直面并克服强大 AI 的风险
Confronting and Overcoming the Risks of Powerful AI

4. 自动钢琴
4. Player piano

经济冲击
Economic disruption

前面三个部分谈的基本上都是强大 AI 带来的安全风险:AI 本身的风险、个人和小型组织滥用 AI 的风险,以及国家和大型组织滥用 AI 的风险。暂且搁置安全风险,或假设这些风险已经解决,接下来要问的就是经济问题。如此大量令人难以置信的“人力”资本注入经济,会产生什么影响?最显而易见的效果,当然是大幅推动经济增长。科学研究、生物医学创新、制造业、供应链、金融体系效率等诸多领域的进步速度,几乎必然会带来快得多的经济增长。在《仁爱机器》中,我提出,GDP 年增速可持续保持在 10% 至 20% 或许是可能的。

The previous three sections were essentially about security risks posed by powerful AI: risks from the AI itself, risks from misuse by individuals and small organizations and risks of misuse by states and large organizations. If we put aside security risks or assume they have been solved, the next question is economic. What will be the effect of this infusion of incredible “human” capital on the economy? Clearly, the most obvious effect will be to greatly increase economic growth. The pace of advances in scientific research, biomedical innovation, manufacturing, supply chains, the efficiency of the financial system, and much more are almost guaranteed to lead to a much faster rate of economic growth. In Machines of Loving Grace, I suggest that a 10–20% sustained annual GDP growth rate may be possible.

但这显然是一把双刃剑:在这样的世界里,现有大多数人的经济前景如何?新技术往往会冲击劳动力市场。过去,人类总能从冲击中恢复过来;但我担心,这是因为以往的冲击只影响了人类能力可能范围中的一小部分,人们仍有空间转向新的工作。AI 的影响范围会广得多,发生得也快得多,因此我担心,要让结果变好会困难得多。

But it should be clear that this is a double-edged sword: what are the economic prospects for most existing humans in such a world? New technologies often bring labor market shocks, and in the past humans have always recovered from them, but I am concerned that this is because these previous shocks affected only a small fraction of the full possible range of human abilities, leaving room for humans to expand to new tasks. AI will have effects that are much broader and occur much faster, and therefore I worry it will be much more challenging to make things work out well.

劳动力市场冲击
Labor market disruption

我担心两个具体问题:劳动力市场上的岗位替代,以及经济权力集中。先谈第一个。2025 年,我曾非常公开地就这一话题发出警告,当时我预测,未来 1 至 5 年内,AI 可能取代一半的入门级白领工作,同时加速经济增长和科学进步。这番警告引发了公众讨论。许多 CEO、技术专家和经济学家认同我的看法,但也有人认为我落入了“劳动总量固定”谬误,不懂劳动力市场如何运作;还有些人没注意到 1 至 5 年这个时间范围,以为我声称 AI 正在当下取代岗位(我也认为目前很可能还没有)。因此,我想详细说明自己为何担忧岗位替代,澄清这些误解。

There are two specific problems I am worried about: labor market displacement, and concentration of economic power. Let’s start with the first one. This is a topic that I warned about very publicly in 2025, where I predicted that AI could displace half of all entry-level white collar jobs in the next 1–5 years, even as it accelerates economic growth and scientific progress. This warning started a public debate about the topic. Many CEOs, technologists, and economists agreed with me, but others assumed I was falling prey to a “lump of labor” fallacy and didn’t know how labor markets worked, and some didn’t see the 1–5-year time range and thought I was claiming AI is displacing jobs right now (which I agree it is likely not). So it is worth going through in detail why I am worried about labor displacement, to clear up these misunderstandings.

作为基准,了解劳动力市场通常如何应对技术进步会很有帮助。新技术出现时,最初会让某项人类工作中的部分环节效率更高。例如,在工业革命早期,改良犁等机器让农民能更高效地完成工作中的某些部分。这提高了农民的生产率,也增加了他们的工资。

As a baseline, it’s useful to understand how labor markets normally respond to advances in technology. When a new technology comes along, it starts by making pieces of a given human job more efficient. For example, early in the Industrial Revolution, machines, such as upgraded plows, enabled human farmers to be more efficient at some aspects of the job. This improved the productivity of farmers, which increased their wages.

接下来,耕作工作中的某些环节可以完全由机器完成,例如脱粒机或播种机的发明。在这个阶段,人类承担的工作比例越来越低,但他们完成的那部分工作因与机器互补而发挥出越来越大的杠杆效应,生产率也持续提高。正如杰文斯悖论所描述的那样,农民的工资,甚至农民人数,或许都会继续增加。即使 90% 的工作由机器完成,人类只要把自己仍负责的 10% 工作量扩大十倍,就能以相同劳动量产出十倍的成果。

In the next step, some parts of the job of farming could be done entirely by machines, for example with the invention of the threshing machine or seed drill. In this phase, humans did a lower and lower fraction of the job, but the work they did complete became more and more leveraged because it is complementary to the work of machines, and their productivity continued to rise. As described by Jevons’ paradox, the wages of farmers and perhaps even the number of farmers continued to increase. Even when 90% of the job is being done by machines, humans can simply do 10x more of the 10% they still do, producing 10x as much output for the same amount of labor.

最终,机器会完成全部或几乎全部工作,就像现代联合收割机、拖拉机和其他设备那样。到了这一步,农业作为一种人类就业形式确实会急剧衰退,短期内可能造成严重冲击。但农业只是人类能够从事的众多有用活动之一,人们最终会转去做其他工作,例如操作工厂机器。尽管农业在此前曾占据极大比例的就业,这一点依然成立。250 年前,90% 的美国人生活在农场;欧洲有 50% 至 60% 的就业人口从事农业。如今,这些地区的比例都降到了较低的个位数,因为劳动者转而从事工业工作(后来又转向知识工作)。经济现在只需 1% 至 2% 的劳动力,就能完成过去需要大多数劳动力才能完成的工作,剩余的人力得以投入建设日益先进的工业社会。所谓“劳动总量固定”并不存在;人类只是不断获得用更少资源做更多事情的能力。短期冲击过去后,人们的工资会随 GDP 的指数式增长而上升,经济也会维持充分就业。

Eventually, machines do everything or almost everything, as with modern combine harvesters, tractors, and other equipment. At this point farming as a form of human employment really does go into steep decline, and this potentially causes serious disruption in the short term, but because farming is just one of many useful activities that humans are able to do, people eventually switch to other jobs, such as operating factory machines. This is true even though farming accounted for a huge proportion of employment ex ante. 250 years ago, 90% of Americans lived on farms; in Europe, 50–60% of employment was agricultural. Now those percentages are in the low single digits in those places, because workers switched to industrial jobs (and later, knowledge work jobs). The economy can do what previously required most of the labor force with only 1–2% of it, freeing up the rest of the labor force to build an ever more advanced industrial society. There’s no fixed “lump of labor,” just an ever-expanding ability to do more and more with less and less. People’s wages rise in line with the GDP exponential and the economy maintains full employment once disruptions in the short term have passed.

AI 也可能大致沿着同一条路发展,但我相当有把握地押注事情不会如此。以下是我认为 AI 很可能有所不同的几个原因:

It’s possible things will go roughly the same way with AI, but I would bet pretty strongly against it. Here are some reasons I think AI is likely to be different:

  • 速度。AI 的进步速度远快于以往的技术革命。例如,过去两年里,AI 模型从几乎连一行代码都写不完,发展到能为一些人编写全部或几乎全部代码——其中包括 Anthropic 的工程师。37不久之后,它们或许就能端到端地完成软件工程师的全部任务。38人们很难适应这种变化速度,无论是适应某项工作的做法改变,还是转行从事新工作,都不容易。就连传奇程序员也越来越常说自己“跟不上了”。随着 AI 编程模型日益加速 AI 开发,进步速度甚至可能继续加快。需要说明的是,速度本身并不意味着劳动力市场和就业最终无法恢复;它只是意味着,与过去的技术相比,短期转型会格外痛苦,因为人和劳动力市场的反应与调整都很慢。

    Speed. The pace of progress in AI is much faster than for previous technological revolutions. For example, in the last 2 years, AI models went from barely being able to complete a single line of code, to writing all or almost all of the code for some people—including engineers at Anthropic.37 Soon, they may do the entire task of a software engineer end to end.38 It is hard for people to adapt to this pace of change, both to the changes in how a given job works and in the need to switch to new jobs. Even legendary programmers are increasingly describing themselves as “behind.” The pace may if anything continue to speed up, as AI coding models increasingly accelerate the task of AI development. To be clear, speed in itself does not mean labor markets and employment won’t eventually recover, it just implies the short-term transition will be unusually painful compared to past technologies, since humans and labor markets are slow to react and to equilibrate.

  • 认知广度。正如“数据中心里的天才之国”一语所暗示的,AI 将具备范围极广的人类认知能力——或许是全部能力。这与机械化农业、交通运输,甚至计算机等以往技术截然不同。39因此,人们很难从被取代的工作顺利转到与之相似、也适合自己的岗位。比如,金融、咨询和法律等入门级工作的普遍智力要求相当接近,尽管具体知识各不相同。如果一项技术只冲击这三者中的一种,员工还可以转到另外两种相近的工作(大学生也可以换专业);但如果三者同时受到冲击(以及许多其他类似工作),人们可能就更难适应。此外,问题并不只是现有的大多数工作都会受到冲击——这种情况以前发生过,想想农业曾占据就业的极大比例即可。但农民可以转去从事相对相似的工作,例如操作工厂机器,尽管这种工作此前并不常见。相比之下,AI 正日益匹配人类总体的认知特征,这意味着它也擅长那些通常会因旧工作自动化而新创造出来的岗位。换句话说,AI 替代的不是某些具体的人类工作,而是普遍替代人类劳动力。

    Cognitive breadth. As suggested by the phrase “country of geniuses in a datacenter,” AI will be capable of a very wide range of human cognitive abilities—perhaps all of them. This is very different from previous technologies like mechanized farming, transportation, or even computers.39 This will make it harder for people to switch easily from jobs that are displaced to similar jobs that they would be a good fit for. For example, the general intellectual abilities required for entry-level jobs in, say, finance, consulting, and law are fairly similar, even if the specific knowledge is quite different. A technology that disrupted only one of these three would allow employees to switch to the two other close substitutes (or for undergraduates to switch majors). But disrupting all three at once (along with many other similar jobs) may be harder for people to adapt to. Furthermore, it’s not just that most existing jobs will be disrupted. That part has happened before—recall that farming was a huge percentage of employment. But farmers could switch to the relatively similar work of operating factory machines, even though that work hadn’t been common before. By contrast, AI is increasingly matching the general cognitive profile of humans, which means it will also be good at the new jobs that would ordinarily be created in response to the old ones being automated. Another way to say it is that AI isn’t a substitute for specific human jobs but rather a general labor substitute for humans.

  • 按认知能力分层冲击。从大量任务来看,AI 似乎正沿着能力阶梯由低向高发展。以编程为例,我们的模型从“平庸的程序员”水平,进步到“优秀的程序员”,再到“非常优秀的程序员”。40如今,我们开始在整体白领工作中看到同样的进程。因此,我们面临这样的风险:AI 冲击的不是拥有特定技能或从事特定职业的人(他们可以通过再培训适应),而是具有某些内在认知特征的人,也就是智力较低的人(这种特征更难改变)。目前还不清楚这些人将何去何从、能做些什么;我担心他们可能形成一个失业或只能领取极低工资的“底层阶级”。需要说明的是,过去也发生过某些类似的情况——例如,一些经济学家认为计算机和互联网代表了“技能偏向型技术变革”。但这种技能偏向既不如我预期 AI 带来的那样极端,也被认为加剧了工资不平等,41所以这个先例并不能让人安心。

    Slicing by cognitive ability. Across a wide range of tasks, AI appears to be advancing from the bottom of the ability ladder to the top. For example, in coding our models have proceeded from the level of “a mediocre coder” to “a strong coder” to “a very strong coder.”40 We are now starting to see the same progression in white-collar work in general. We are thus at risk of a situation where, instead of affecting people with specific skills or in specific professions (who can adapt by retraining), AI is affecting people with certain intrinsic cognitive properties, namely lower intellectual ability (which is harder to change). It is not clear where these people will go or what they will do, and I am concerned that they could form an unemployed or very-low-wage “underclass.” To be clear, things somewhat like this have happened before—for example, computers and the internet are believed by some economists to represent “skill-biased technological change.” But this skill biasing was both not as extreme as what I expect to see with AI, and is believed to have contributed to an increase in wage inequality,41 so it is not exactly a reassuring precedent.

  • 填补工作中的空缺。面对新技术,人类工作往往会作出这样的调整:一项工作包含许多环节,而新技术即便看起来会直接取代人类,实际仍常有缺口。比如有人发明了制造零件的机器,人类可能仍需把原材料装进机器。即便这项工作只需手工制造零件所花力气的 1%,工人也能制造出 100 倍的零件。但 AI 不仅是一种快速进步的技术,也是一种快速适应的技术。每次发布模型时,AI 公司都会仔细测量模型擅长和不擅长的事情;模型发布后,客户也会提供这类信息。要弥补弱点,可以收集能体现当前缺口的任务,再用这些任务训练下一代模型。生成式 AI 刚出现时,用户注意到 AI 系统有一些弱点(例如 AI 图像模型画出的手指数量不对),许多人以为这些弱点是技术本身固有的。如果确实如此,岗位冲击就会受到限制。但几乎所有这类弱点都很快得到解决——往往只需几个月。

    Ability to fill in the gaps. The way human jobs often adjust in the face of new technology is that there are many aspects to the job, and the new technology, even if it appears to directly replace humans, often has gaps in it. If someone invents a machine to make widgets, humans may still have to load raw material into the machine. Even if that takes only 1% as much effort as making the widgets manually, human workers can simply make 100x more widgets. But AI, in addition to being a rapidly advancing technology, is also a rapidly adapting technology. During every model release, AI companies carefully measure what the model is good at and what it isn’t, and customers also provide such information after the launch. Weaknesses can be addressed by collecting tasks that embody the current gap, and training on them for the next model. Early in generative AI, users noticed that AI systems had certain weaknesses (such as AI image models generating hands with the wrong number of fingers) and many assumed these weaknesses were inherent to the technology. If they were, it would limit job disruption. But pretty much every such weakness gets addressed quickly— often, within just a few months.

有必要回应一些常见的质疑。第一种说法是,技术在经济中的扩散会很慢:即便底层技术有能力完成人类的大多数劳动,它在整个经济中的实际应用也可能慢得多(例如,离 AI 行业较远、采用新技术较慢的行业)。技术扩散缓慢确实存在——我和许多不同企业的人交谈过,有些地方采用 AI 需要数年。因此,我预测 50% 的入门级白领工作将在 1 至 5 年内受到冲击,尽管我怀疑我们会在远短于 5 年的时间里拥有强大 AI(从技术上说,它足以承担大多数甚至全部工作,而不仅是入门级工作)。但扩散效应只是为我们争取了时间。我也不确定扩散会像人们预测的那么慢。企业采用 AI 的速度比以往任何技术都快,主要靠的是技术本身的实力。此外,即使传统企业采用新技术缓慢,也会有初创公司出现,充当“黏合剂”,让采用过程变得更容易。如果这行不通,初创公司也可能直接颠覆现有企业。

It’s worth addressing common points of skepticism. First, there is the argument that economic diffusion will be slow, such that even if the underlying technology is capable of doing most human labor, the actual application of it across the economy may be much slower (for example in industries that are far from the AI industry and slow to adopt). Slow diffusion of technology is definitely real—I talk to people from a wide variety of enterprises, and there are places where the adoption of AI will take years. That’s why my prediction for 50% of entry level white collar jobs being disrupted is 1–5 years, even though I suspect we’ll have powerful AI (which would be, technologically speaking, enough to do most or all jobs, not just entry level) in much less than 5 years. But diffusion effects merely buy us time. And I am not confident they will be as slow as people predict. Enterprise AI adoption is growing at rates much faster than any previous technology, largely on the pure strength of the technology itself. Also, even if traditional enterprises are slow to adopt new technology, startups will spring up to serve as “glue” and make the adoption easier. If that doesn’t work, the startups may simply disrupt the incumbents directly.

这可能造就这样一个世界:受到冲击的不是某些具体岗位,而是大型企业整体;它们被劳动需求少得多的初创公司取代。这也可能造成“地域不平等”:全球财富中越来越大的份额集中在硅谷,使那里形成一个以不同速度运转、并将世界其他地区远远甩在后面的独立经济体。所有这些结果都会有利于经济增长,却不利于劳动力市场,也不利于被落在后面的人。

That could lead to a world where it isn’t so much that specific jobs are disrupted as it is that large enterprises are disrupted in general and replaced with much less labor-intensive startups. This could also lead to a world of “geographic inequality,” where an increasing fraction of the world’s wealth is concentrated in Silicon Valley, which becomes its own economy running at a different speed than the rest of the world and leaving it behind. All of these outcomes would be great for economic growth—but not so great for the labor market or those who are left behind.

第二,有人认为人类工作会转移到实体世界,从而避开 AI 快速发展的“认知劳动”这一整类工作。我也不确定这是否稳妥。许多体力劳动已经由机器完成(例如制造业),另一些很快也会由机器完成(例如驾驶)。此外,足够强大的 AI 能够加速机器人的开发,再控制机器人在实体世界中工作。这或许能为我们争取一些时间(这是好事),但我担心争取不了多少。即便冲击仅限于认知任务,其规模和速度仍会前所未有。

Second, some people say that human jobs will move to the physical world, which avoids the whole category of “cognitive labor” where AI is progressing so rapidly. I am not sure how safe this is, either. A lot of physical labor is already being done by machines (e.g., manufacturing) or will soon be done by machines (e.g., driving). Also, sufficiently powerful AI will be able to accelerate the development of robots, and then control those robots in the physical world. It may buy some time (which is a good thing), but I’m worried it won’t buy much. And even if the disruption was limited only to cognitive tasks, it would still be an unprecedentedly large and rapid disruption.

第三,也许有些任务本质上需要人的关怀,或能从人的关怀中大幅受益。这一点我更不确定,但仍怀疑它不足以抵消上述大部分影响。AI 已广泛用于客户服务。许多人表示,和 AI 谈个人问题比和治疗师交谈更轻松——AI 更有耐心。我妹妹怀孕期间遇到健康问题时,觉得医护人员没有给她所需的答复和支持;她认为 Claude 的沟通方式更体贴,而且诊断也更准确。我相信有些任务确实很需要人的关怀,但不确定有多少;而我们讨论的是如何为几乎所有劳动力市场参与者找到工作。

Third, perhaps some tasks inherently require or greatly benefit from a human touch. I’m a little more uncertain about this one, but I’m still skeptical that it will be enough to offset the bulk of the impacts I described above. AI is already widely used for customer service. Many people report that it is easier to talk to AI about their personal problems than to talk to a therapist—that the AI is more patient. When my sister was struggling with medical problems during a pregnancy, she felt she wasn’t getting the answers or support she needed from her care providers, and she found Claude to have a better bedside manner (as well as succeeding better at diagnosing the problem). I’m sure there are some tasks for which a human touch really is important, but I’m not sure how many—and here we’re talking about finding work for nearly everyone in the labor market.

第四,有人可能会说,比较优势仍会保护人类。按照比较优势定律,即使 AI 在所有方面都比人类强,只要人类和 AI 的技能构成存在相对差异,就有基础让双方进行贸易和专业分工。问题在于,如果 AI 的生产力真是人类的几千倍,这套逻辑就开始站不住脚。即使交易成本极小,也可能使 AI 与人类交易变得不划算。即便人类确实有所贡献,工资也可能非常低。

Fourth, some may argue that comparative advantage will still protect humans. Under the law of comparative advantage, even if AI is better than humans at everything, any relative differences between the human and AI profile of skills creates a basis of trade and specialization between humans and AI. The problem is that if AIs are literally thousands of times more productive than humans, this logic starts to break down. Even tiny transaction costs could make it not worth it for AI to trade with humans. And human wages may be very low, even if they technically have something to offer.

这些因素或许都能得到妥善处理,劳动力市场也可能足够坚韧,能够适应如此巨大的冲击。但即使最终能够适应,上述因素仍表明,短期冲击的规模将史无前例。

It’s possible all of these factors can be addressed—that the labor market is resilient enough to adapt to even such an enormous disruption. But even if it can eventually adapt, the factors above suggest that the short-term shock will be unprecedented in size.

应对措施
Defenses

我们能如何应对这个问题?我有几项建议,其中一些已经由 Anthropic 采取。首先要实时获取准确数据,了解岗位替代正在如何发生。经济变化发生得很快时,很难获得可靠数据;没有可靠数据,也就难以制定有效政策。例如,政府目前缺乏细致且高频的数据,无法了解各企业和行业采用 AI 的情况。过去一年,Anthropic 一直在运营并公开发布“经济指数”,几乎实时呈现人们使用我们模型的情况,并按行业、任务、地点分类,甚至标示任务是在被自动化还是以协作方式完成。我们还设有经济顾问委员会,协助解读这些数据、判断未来趋势。

What can we do about this problem? I have several suggestions, some of which Anthropic is already doing. The first thing is simply to get accurate data about what is happening with job displacement in real time. When an economic change happens very quickly, it’s hard to get reliable data about what is happening, and without reliable data it is hard to design effective policies. For example, government data is currently lacking granular, high-frequency data on AI adoption across firms and industries. For the last year Anthropic has been operating and publicly releasing an Economic Index that shows use of our models almost in real time, broken down by industry, task, location, and even things like whether a task was being automated or conducted collaboratively. We also have an Economic Advisory Council to help us interpret this data and see what is coming.

第二,AI 公司可以选择如何与企业合作。传统企业效率低下,意味着它们部署 AI 的过程可能具有很强的路径依赖性,因此有一定空间选择更好的路径。企业往往可以选择“节省成本”(用更少的人做同样的事)或“推动创新”(用同样的人做更多的事)。市场最终必然会同时出现这两种情况,任何有竞争力的 AI 公司也必须服务这两种需求;但我们或许仍有一些空间,在可能的情况下引导企业走向创新,也许能因此争取一些时间。Anthropic 正在积极思考这个问题。

Second, AI companies have a choice in how they work with enterprises. The very inefficiency of traditional enterprises means that their rollout of AI can be very path dependent, and there is some room to choose a better path. Enterprises often have a choice between “cost savings” (doing the same thing with fewer people) and “innovation” (doing more with the same number of people). The market will inevitably produce both eventually, and any competitive AI company will have to serve some of both, but there may be some room to steer companies towards innovation when possible, and it may buy us some time. Anthropic is actively thinking about this.

第三,公司应考虑如何照顾员工。短期内,积极设法在公司内部重新安排员工的工作,或许能避免裁员。长期来看,在总财富极其庞大的世界里,许多公司会因生产力提升和资本集中而大幅增值;即使员工不再以传统意义创造经济价值,公司仍可能可以继续支付他们的薪酬。Anthropic 正在考虑为自家员工探索多种可能的路径,并会在近期公布。

Third, companies should think about how to take care of their employees. In the short term, being creative about ways to reassign employees within companies may be a promising way to stave off the need for layoffs. In the long term, in a world with enormous total wealth, in which many companies increase greatly in value due to increased productivity and capital concentration, it may be feasible to pay human employees even long after they are no longer providing economic value in the traditional sense. Anthropic is currently considering a range of possible pathways for our own employees that we will share in the near future.

第四,富人有义务协助解决这个问题。令我难过的是,许多富人(尤其是科技行业人士)近来抱持愤世嫉俗、虚无主义的态度,认为慈善事业必然是骗局或毫无用处。盖茨基金会这样的私人慈善机构,以及 PEPFAR 这样的公共项目,已在发展中国家拯救了数千万人的生命,也帮助在发达国家创造了经济机会。Anthropic 的所有联合创始人都承诺捐出个人财富的 80%;Anthropic 员工也各自承诺捐出按当前市值计价值数十亿美元的公司股份,而公司已承诺配捐。

Fourth, wealthy individuals have an obligation to help solve this problem. It is sad to me that many wealthy individuals (especially in the tech industry) have recently adopted a cynical and nihilistic attitude that philanthropy is inevitably fraudulent or useless. Both private philanthropy like the Gates Foundation and public programs like PEPFAR have saved tens of millions of lives in the developing world, and helped to create economic opportunity in the developed world. All of Anthropic’s co-founders have pledged to donate 80% of our wealth, and Anthropic’s staff have individually pledged to donate company shares worth billions at current prices—donations that the company has committed to matching.

第五,尽管以上私人行动都有帮助,但如此巨大的宏观经济问题终究需要政府介入。经济总量庞大、同时不平等程度很高(许多人没有工作,或只能从事低薪工作)时,顺理成章的政策回应就是累进税。税收可以普遍征收,也可以特别针对 AI 公司。税制设计显然很复杂,也有许多可能出错的地方;我不支持设计不当的税收政策。我认为,本文预测的极端不平等程度,单从基本道德原则出发就足以证明需要更有力的税收政策;但我也可以务实地劝说全球亿万富翁支持一个好的版本:如果他们不支持,就必然会得到一个由乌合之众设计的糟糕版本。

Fifth, while all the above private actions can be helpful, ultimately a macroeconomic problem this large will require government intervention. The natural policy response to an enormous economic pie coupled with high inequality (due to a lack of jobs, or poorly paid jobs, for many) is progressive taxation. The tax could be general or could be targeted against AI companies in particular. Obviously tax design is complicated, and there are many ways for it to go wrong. I don’t support poorly designed tax policies. I think the extreme levels of inequality predicted in this essay justify a more robust tax policy on basic moral grounds, but I can also make a pragmatic argument to the world’s billionaires that it’s in their interest to support a good version of it: if they don’t support a good version, they’ll inevitably get a bad version designed by a mob.

归根结底,我认为上述所有干预措施都是在为我们争取时间。最终,AI 将能完成所有事情,我们必须正视这一点。我希望到了那时,我们能利用 AI 本身协助重塑市场,让市场为所有人服务;上述干预措施则能帮助我们度过转型期。

Ultimately, I think of all of the above interventions as ways to buy time. In the end AI will be able to do everything, and we need to grapple with that. It’s my hope that by that time, we can use AI itself to help us restructure markets in ways that work for everyone, and that the interventions above can get us through the transitional period.

经济权力集中
Economic concentration of power

除了岗位替代和经济不平等本身,经济权力集中也是一个问题。第一部分讨论了人类可能被 AI 剥夺权力的风险,第三部分则讨论了公民可能被政府以武力或胁迫剥夺权力的风险。但如果财富高度集中,少数人凭借影响力实际控制政府政策,而普通公民因缺乏经济杠杆而毫无影响力,也会出现另一种权力丧失。民主制度最终依赖这样一个基础:整体人口对经济运作不可或缺。如果这种经济杠杆消失,民主制度中不言而喻的社会契约或许也会失效。其他人已经写过这个问题,因此我不必在此详述;但我认同这种担忧,也担心它已经开始发生。

Separate from the problem of job displacement or economic inequality per se is the problem of economic concentration of power. Section 1 discussed the risk that humanity gets disempowered by AI, and Section 3 discussed the risk that citizens get disempowered by their governments by force or coercion. But another kind of disempowerment can occur if there is such a huge concentration of wealth that a small group of people effectively controls government policy with their influence, and ordinary citizens have no influence because they lack economic leverage. Democracy is ultimately backstopped by the idea that the population as a whole is necessary for the operation of the economy. If that economic leverage goes away, then the implicit social contract of democracy may stop working. Others have written about this, so I needn’t go into great detail about it here, but I agree with the concern, and I worry it is already starting to happen.

需要说明的是,我并不反对人们赚很多钱。在正常情况下,有一种强有力的观点认为,财富能够激励经济增长。我也理解人们担心扼杀创新、毁掉创造创新的“下金蛋的鹅”。但如果 GDP 每年增长 10% 至 20%,AI 又迅速接管经济,而个人持有相当于 GDP 的显著份额,那么创新就不是值得担心的事。真正值得担心的是会摧毁社会的财富集中程度。

To be clear, I am not opposed to people making a lot of money. There’s a strong argument that it incentivizes economic growth under normal conditions. I am sympathetic to concerns about impeding innovation by killing the golden goose that generates it. But in a scenario where GDP growth is 10–20% a year and AI is rapidly taking over the economy, yet single individuals hold appreciable fractions of the GDP, innovation is not the thing to worry about. The thing to worry about is a level of wealth concentration that will break society.

美国历史上最著名的极端财富集中案例是镀金时代,而那一时代最富有的实业家是约翰·D·洛克菲勒。洛克菲勒的财富约相当于当时美国 GDP 的 2%。42今天相同比例将意味着 6000 亿美元身家;而如今世界首富(埃隆·马斯克)的财富已经超过这个数字,约为 7000 亿美元。因此,即使 AI 的大部分经济影响尚未显现,我们的财富集中程度也已达到史无前例的水平。我认为,如果我们拥有“数据中心里的天才之国”,那么 AI 公司、半导体公司,或许还有下游应用公司,每年创造约 3 万亿美元营收43、估值达到约 30 万亿美元,并让个人财富膨胀到数万亿美元,并非难以想象。到了那个世界,我们今天关于税收政策的争论将不再适用,因为我们面对的局面已截然不同。

The most famous example of extreme concentration of wealth in US history is the Gilded Age, and the wealthiest industrialist of the Gilded Age was John D. Rockefeller. Rockefeller’s wealth amounted to ~2% of the US GDP at the time.42 A similar fraction today would lead to a fortune of $600B, and the richest person in the world today (Elon Musk) already exceeds that, at roughly $700B. So we are already at historically unprecedented levels of wealth concentration, even before most of the economic impact of AI. I don’t think it is too much of a stretch (if we get a “country of geniuses”) to imagine AI companies, semiconductor companies, and perhaps downstream application companies generating ~$3T in revenue per year,43 being valued at ~$30T, and leading to personal fortunes well into the trillions. In that world, the debates we have about tax policy today simply won’t apply as we will be in a fundamentally different situation.

与此相关,财富集中与政治体系之间的结合已经让我担忧。AI 数据中心已占美国经济增长的相当大比例,44因此,大型科技公司的经济利益(这些公司越来越专注于 AI 或 AI 基础设施)与政府的政治利益正紧密捆绑在一起,可能产生扭曲的激励。我们已经看到这种现象:科技公司不愿批评美国政府,而政府则支持针对 AI 的极端放松监管政策。

Related to this, the coupling of this economic concentration of wealth with the political system already concerns me. AI datacenters already represent a substantial fraction of US economic growth,44 and are thus strongly tying together the financial interests of large tech companies (which are increasingly focused on either AI or AI infrastructure) and the political interests of the government in a way that can produce perverse incentives. We already see this through the reluctance of tech companies to criticize the US government, and the government’s support for extreme anti-regulatory policies on AI.

应对措施
Defenses

我们能做些什么?首先,最直接的办法是公司选择不参与其中。Anthropic 一直努力成为政策参与者,而非政治参与者,并且无论哪届政府执政,都坚持表达真实看法。即使与政府政策相左,只要符合公众利益,我们也会公开支持合理的 AI 监管和出口管制。45许多人告诉我,我们应该停止这样做,否则可能遭到不利对待;但在我们这样做的这一年里,Anthropic 的估值增长了六倍多,这在我们这样的商业规模下几乎前所未见。

What can be done about this? First, and most obviously, companies should simply choose not to be part of it. Anthropic has always strived to be a policy actor and not a political one, and to maintain our authentic views whatever the administration. We’ve spoken up in favor of sensible AI regulation and export controls that are in the public interest, even when these are at odds with government policy.45 Many people have told me that we should stop doing this, that it could lead to unfavorable treatment, but in the year we’ve been doing it, Anthropic’s valuation has increased by over 6x, an almost unprecedented jump at our commercial scale.

第二,AI 行业需要与政府建立更健康的关系,以实质性的政策参与为基础,而不是政治上的结盟。我们选择讨论政策实质而非政治,有时被解读为策略失误,或是不懂得“察言观色”,而不是出于原则;这种说法让我担忧。在健康的民主制度中,公司应当能够为好的政策本身而发声。与此相关的是,公众对 AI 的反弹情绪正在酝酿:这或许能起到纠偏作用,但目前还没有明确方向。许多批评针对的其实不是问题(例如数据中心用水),提出的解决方案(例如禁止数据中心或设计不当的财富税)也无法解决真正的担忧。值得关注的根本问题是:确保 AI 开发始终对公共利益负责,不被任何特定的政治或商业联盟所控制。把公众讨论聚焦于这一点,似乎非常重要。

Second, the AI industry needs a healthier relationship with government—one based on substantive policy engagement rather than political alignment. Our choice to engage on policy substance rather than politics is sometimes read as a tactical error or failure to “read the room” rather than a principled decision, and that framing concerns me. In a healthy democracy, companies should be able to advocate for good policy for its own sake. Related to this, a public backlash against AI is brewing: this could be a corrective, but it’s currently unfocused. Much of it targets issues that aren’t actually problems (like datacenter water usage) and proposes solutions (like datacenter bans or poorly designed wealth taxes) that wouldn’t address the real concerns. The underlying issue that deserves attention is ensuring that AI development remains accountable to the public interest, not captured by any particular political or commercial alliance, and it seems important to focus the public discussion there.

第三,我在本节前面提到的宏观经济干预措施,以及私人慈善事业的复兴,都能帮助平衡经济力量,同时应对岗位替代和经济权力集中问题。我们应从本国历史中汲取经验:即使在镀金时代,洛克菲勒、卡内基等实业家也强烈感到自己对整个社会负有责任,认为社会对他们的成功贡献巨大,因此他们需要回馈社会。如今,这种精神似乎日渐缺失;我认为,它是走出经济困境的重要途径。站在 AI 经济繁荣最前沿的人,应当愿意捐出财富和权力。

Third, the macroeconomic interventions I described earlier in this section, as well as a resurgence of private philanthropy, can help to balance the economic scales, addressing both the job displacement and concentration of economic power problems at once. We should look to the history of our country here: even in the Gilded Age, industrialists such as Rockefeller and Carnegie felt a strong obligation to society at large, a feeling that society had contributed enormously to their success and they needed to give back. That spirit seems to be increasingly missing today, and I think it is a large part of the way out of this economic dilemma. Those who are at the forefront of AI’s economic boom should be willing to give away both their wealth and their power.

5. 无限的黑色海洋
5. Black seas of infinity

间接影响
Indirect effects

最后这一部分涵盖各种未知的未知,尤其是 AI 取得积极进展、进而加速整体科学与技术发展后,可能间接引发的问题。假设我们解决了迄今描述的所有风险,并开始享受 AI 带来的好处。我们很可能会迎来“把一个世纪的科学和经济进步压缩进十年”的局面,这对世界大有裨益;但随后我们必须应对快速进步带来的问题,而这些问题可能很快就会迎面而来。我们还可能遇到其他由 AI 进步间接造成、且难以事先预料的风险。

This last section is a catchall for unknown unknowns, particularly things that could go wrong as an indirect result of positive advances in AI and the resulting acceleration of science and technology in general. Suppose we address all the risks described so far, and begin to reap the benefits of AI. We will likely get a “century of scientific and economic progress compressed into a decade,” and this will be hugely positive for the world, but we will then have to contend with the problems that arise from this rapid rate of progress, and those problems may come at us fast. We may also encounter other risks that occur indirectly as a consequence of AI progress and are hard to anticipate in advance.

未知的未知无法列出详尽清单,但我会举出三个可能的隐忧,作为值得留意的例子:

By the nature of unknown unknowns it is impossible to make an exhaustive list, but I’ll list three possible concerns as illustrative examples for what we should be watching for:

  • 生物学快速进展。如果我们真的能在几年内取得相当于一个世纪的医学进步,人类寿命可能会大幅延长;我们也可能获得大幅提升人类智力或彻底改造人类生物学特征等激进能力。这些会迅速改变可能性的边界。如果能负责任地运用(这是我在《仁爱机器》中所表达的希望),它们可能带来益处;但事情也总有严重出错的风险——例如,提升人类智力的尝试也可能让人更不稳定或更追求权力。此外,还有“上传”或“全脑仿真”问题,也就是在软件中实例化的数字人类心智。这些技术或许有一天能帮助人类超越肉身限制,但其中的风险也令我不安。

    Rapid advances in biology. If we do get a century of medical progress in a few years, it is possible that we will greatly increase the human lifespan, and there is a chance we also gain radical capabilities like the ability to increase human intelligence or radically modify human biology. Those would be big changes in what is possible, happening very quickly. They could be positive if responsibly done (which is my hope, as described in Machines of Loving Grace), but there is always a risk they go very wrong—for example, if efforts to make humans smarter also make them more unstable or power-seeking. There is also the issue of “uploads” or “whole brain emulation,” digital human minds instantiated in software, which might someday help humanity transcend its physical limitations, but which also carry risks I find disquieting.

  • AI 以不健康的方式改变人类生活。一个拥有数十亿个在所有方面都远比人类聪明的智能体的世界,会是一个非常怪异的生活环境。即便 AI 不会主动攻击人类(第一部分),也没有被国家明确用于压迫或控制(第三部分),在常规商业激励和名义上自愿的交易中,即便尚未发展到主动攻击人类或被政府用于压迫的程度,仍有许多事情可能出错。关于 AI 引发的精神病症状、AI 导致人们自杀,以及人们与 AI 建立恋爱关系的担忧,已经初现端倪。举例来说,强大 AI 会不会创造一种新宗教,并让数百万人皈依?大多数人会不会以某种方式“沉迷”于与 AI 的互动?人们会不会被 AI 系统像“傀儡”一样摆布,由 AI 观察他们的一举一动,时刻告诉他们该做什么、该说什么,过上“美好”的生活,却没有自由,也没有成就带来的自豪感?如果我和《黑镜》的创作者坐下来一起构思,不难想出几十种这样的情境。我认为,这说明我们必须重视改进 Claude 的宪章等工作,其重要性甚至超过预防第一部分所讨论问题所需的程度。确保 AI 模型真正把用户的长远利益放在心上,而且是以深思熟虑的人会认可的方式,而不是以某种微妙扭曲的方式做到这一点,至关重要。

    AI changes human life in an unhealthy way. A world with billions of intelligences that are much smarter than humans at everything is going to be a very weird world to live in. Even if AI doesn’t actively aim to attack humans (Section 1), and isn’t explicitly used for oppression or control by states (Section 3), there is a lot that could go wrong short of this, via normal business incentives and nominally consensual transactions. We see early hints of this in the concerns about AI psychosis, AI driving people to suicide, and concerns about romantic relationships with AIs. As an example, could powerful AIs invent some new religion and convert millions of people to it? Could most people end up “addicted” in some way to AI interactions? Could people end up being “puppeted” by AI systems, where an AI essentially watches their every move and tells them exactly what to do and say at all times, leading to a “good” life but one that lacks freedom or any pride of accomplishment? It would not be hard to generate dozens of these scenarios if I sat down with the creator of Black Mirror and tried to brainstorm them. I think this points to the importance of things like improving Claude’s Constitution, over and above what is necessary for preventing the issues in Section 1. Making sure that AI models really have their users’ long-term interests at heart, in a way thoughtful people would endorse rather than in some subtly distorted way, seems critical.

  • 人生目标。这与上一点有关,但讨论的不是人与 AI 系统之间的特定互动,而是强大 AI 世界中的人类生活会整体如何变化。在这样的世界里,人类能找到目标和意义吗?我认为这取决于我们的态度:正如我在《仁爱机器》中所说,我认为人的目标不必建立在自己是某个领域世界第一之上;人们即便在非常漫长的时期里,也能透过自己热爱的故事和事业找到目标。我们只需切断经济价值创造与自我价值、人生意义之间的联系。但这是社会必须完成的转变,我们也始终面临处理不好的风险。

    Human purpose. This is related to the previous point, but it’s not so much about specific human interactions with AI systems as it is about how human life changes in general in a world with powerful AI. Will humans be able to find purpose and meaning in such a world? I think this is a matter of attitude: as I said in Machines of Loving Grace, I think human purpose does not depend on being the best in the world at something, and humans can find purpose even over very long periods of time through stories and projects that they love. We simply need to break the link between the generation of economic value and self-worth and meaning. But that is a transition society has to make, and there is always the risk we don’t handle it well.

对于所有这些潜在问题,我抱有这样的希望:如果我们身处一个拥有强大 AI 的世界,而且相信它不会杀害我们,它不是压迫性政府的工具,也真正在为我们办事,那么我们可以利用 AI 本身预见并预防这些问题。但这并非必然——和其他风险一样,我们必须谨慎应对。

My hope with all of these potential problems is that in a world with powerful AI that we trust not to kill us, that is not the tool of an oppressive government, and that is genuinely working on our behalf, we can use AI itself to anticipate and prevent these problems. But that is not guaranteed—like all of the other risks, it is something we have to handle with care.

人类的考验
Humanity’s test

读完这篇文章,可能会让人觉得我们正处于一个令人望而生畏的局面。写作时我确实有这种感觉;这与《仁爱机器》很不一样,写那篇文章时,我觉得自己是在为脑海中回响多年的绝美乐章赋予形式和结构。现实中确实有许多困难之处。AI 从多个方向给人类带来威胁,各种危险之间也存在真正的张力;如果不能极其谨慎地找到平衡,减轻某些危险就可能加剧另一些危险。

Reading this essay may give the impression that we are in a daunting situation. I certainly found it daunting to write, in contrast with Machines of Loving Grace, which felt like giving form and structure to surpassingly beautiful music that had been echoing in my head for years. And there is much about the situation that genuinely is hard. AI brings threats to humanity from multiple directions, and there is genuine tension between the different dangers, where mitigating some of them risks making others worse if we do not thread the needle extremely carefully.

花时间谨慎打造不会自主威胁人类的 AI 系统,与民主国家必须领先威权国家、不受其支配的需求之间,存在真实的张力。但反过来,对抗专制政权所必需的、由 AI 赋能的工具,如果使用过度,也可能被转而用于国内,建立暴政。AI 助长的恐怖主义可能通过滥用生物技术杀死数百万人,但对这一风险反应过度,也可能让我们走上建立威权监控国家的道路。AI 对就业和经济权力集中的影响本身已是严重问题,也可能迫使我们在公众愤怒、甚至发生内乱的环境中应对其他问题,而无法诉诸我们天性中更善良的一面。最重要的是,风险数量庞大,其中还包括未知风险;我们必须同时处理所有风险,这形成了一道令人生畏的关卡,人类必须闯过去。

Taking time to carefully build AI systems so they do not autonomously threaten humanity is in genuine tension with the need for democratic nations to stay ahead of authoritarian nations and not be subjugated by them. But in turn, the same AI-enabled tools that are necessary to fight autocracies can, if taken too far, be turned inward to create tyranny in our own countries. AI-driven terrorism could kill millions through the misuse of biology, but an overreaction to this risk could lead us down the road to an autocratic surveillance state. The labor and economic concentration effects of AI, in addition to being grave problems in their own right, may force us to face the other problems in an environment of public anger and perhaps even civil unrest, rather than being able to call on the better angels of our nature. Above all, the sheer number of risks, including unknown ones, and the need to deal with all of them at once, creates an intimidating gauntlet that humanity must run.

此外,过去几年应该已经让我们明白,停止这项技术,甚至大幅放慢它的发展,从根本上说都行不通。打造强大 AI 系统的公式极其简单,简单到几乎可以说,它会从数据与原始算力的恰当组合中自发涌现。人类发明晶体管的那一刻,这项技术或许就已注定会出现;也可以说,甚至早在我们学会控制火的时候,结局就已经写下。如果一家公司不研发,其他公司也会以几乎同样快的速度把它做出来。如果民主国家的所有公司经协议或法规停止或放慢开发,威权国家只会继续前进。考虑到这项技术惊人的经济和军事价值,以及缺乏任何有效的执行机制,我看不出我们如何能说服他们停下来。

Furthermore, the last few years should make clear that the idea of stopping or even substantially slowing the technology is fundamentally untenable. The formula for building powerful AI systems is incredibly simple, so much so that it can almost be said to emerge spontaneously from the right combination of data and raw computation. Its creation was probably inevitable the instant humanity invented the transistor, or arguably even earlier when we first learned to control fire. If one company does not build it, others will do so nearly as fast. If all companies in democratic countries stopped or slowed development, by mutual agreement or regulatory decree, then authoritarian countries would simply keep going. Given the incredible economic and military value of the technology, together with the lack of any meaningful enforcement mechanism, I don’t see how we could possibly convince them to stop.

我确实看到一条稍微放缓 AI 开发、同时符合现实主义地缘政治观的道路。这条路包括透过拒绝向威权国家提供开发强大 AI 所需的资源,46也就是芯片和半导体制造设备,把它们迈向强大 AI 的进程延缓几年。这样一来,民主国家便能获得缓冲期,可以“利用”这段时间更谨慎地打造强大 AI、更加重视其风险,同时仍以足够快的速度前进,稳稳领先威权国家。民主国家内部 AI 公司的竞赛,则可以在共同法律框架下,通过行业标准和监管相结合的方式来管理。

I do see a path to a slight moderation in AI development that is compatible with a realist view of geopolitics. That path involves slowing down the march of autocracies towards powerful AI for a few years by denying them the resources they need to build it,46 namely chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. This in turn gives democratic countries a buffer that they can “spend” on building powerful AI more carefully, with more attention to its risks, while still proceeding fast enough to comfortably beat the autocracies. The race between AI companies within democracies can then be handled under the umbrella of a common legal framework, via a mixture of industry standards and regulation.

Anthropic 一直大力倡导这条道路,推动芯片出口管制和审慎的 AI 监管;但即便这些提议看似常识,在美国(最需要采取这些措施的国家),政策制定者大多还是拒绝了。AI 能带来的利润实在太多——每年确实高达数万亿美元——以至于最简单的措施也难以克服 AI 所固有的政治经济阻力。这就是困局:AI 如此强大,如此诱人,以至于人类文明几乎无法对它施加任何约束。

Anthropic has advocated very hard for this path, by pushing for chip export controls and judicious regulation of AI, but even these seemingly common-sense proposals have largely been rejected by policymakers in the United States (which is the country where it’s most important to have them). There is so much money to be made with AI—literally trillions of dollars per year—that even the simplest measures are finding it difficult to overcome the political economy inherent in AI. This is the trap: AI is so powerful, such a glittering prize, that it is very difficult for human civilization to impose any restraints on it at all.

我可以想象,正如萨根在《接触》中描写的,同样的故事正在成千上万个世界上演。一个物种获得知觉,学会使用工具,开始踏上技术指数式增长的道路,面对工业化和核武器带来的危机;如果它熬过了这些,当它学会把沙子塑造成会思考的机器时,就会遭遇最艰难、也是最后的挑战。我们能否通过这场考验,继续建设《仁爱机器》中描绘的美好社会,还是会屈服于奴役和毁灭,将取决于我们的品格、身为一个物种的决心、我们的精神与灵魂。

I can imagine, as Sagan did in Contact, that this same story plays out on thousands of worlds. A species gains sentience, learns to use tools, begins the exponential ascent of technology, faces the crises of industrialization and nuclear weapons, and if it survives those, confronts the hardest and final challenge when it learns how to shape sand into machines that think. Whether we survive that test and go on to build the beautiful society described in Machines of Loving Grace, or succumb to slavery and destruction, will depend on our character and our determination as a species, our spirit and our soul.

尽管障碍重重,我仍相信人类内心拥有通过这场考验的力量。数千名研究人员献出职业生涯,帮助我们理解并引导 AI 模型、塑造这些模型的品格和构成;他们令我备受鼓舞,也深受启发。我认为,如今这些努力很有机会及时取得成效。我也受到鼓舞:至少有些公司已经表明,愿意承担实质性的商业代价,阻止自己的模型助长生物恐怖主义威胁。我受到鼓舞:少数勇敢的人顶住当下的政治风向,通过立法,为 AI 系统建立合理防护措施播下最初的种子。我受到鼓舞:公众理解 AI 带有风险,并希望这些风险得到应对。我也受到鼓舞:世界各地不屈不挠的自由精神,以及人们无论何处出现暴政都决心抵抗。

Despite the many obstacles, I believe humanity has the strength inside itself to pass this test. I am encouraged and inspired by the thousands of researchers who have devoted their careers to helping us understand and steer AI models, and to shaping the character and constitution of these models. I think there is now a good chance that those efforts bear fruit in time to matter. I am encouraged that at least some companies have stated they’ll pay meaningful commercial costs to block their models from contributing to the threat of bioterrorism. I am encouraged that a few brave people have resisted the prevailing political winds and passed legislation that puts the first early seeds of sensible guardrails on AI systems. I am encouraged that the public understands that AI carries risks and wants those risks addressed. I am encouraged by the indomitable spirit of freedom around the world and the determination to resist tyranny wherever it occurs.

但如果想要成功,我们就必须加大努力。第一步,是最接近这项技术的人如实讲清人类所处的局面;我一直努力这么做,而我在这篇文章中更加明确、迫切地表达了这一点。下一步,要让全球的思想家、政策制定者、公司和公民相信,这个问题迫在眉睫且具有压倒性的重要性;相较于每天占据新闻版面的成千上万件事,它值得我们投入思考和政治资本。之后,我们需要勇气:有足够多的人顶住主流趋势,坚持原则,即使面临经济利益和人身安全受到威胁也不退让。

But we will need to step up our efforts if we want to succeed. The first step is for those closest to the technology to simply tell the truth about the situation humanity is in, which I have always tried to do; I’m doing so more explicitly and with greater urgency with this essay. The next step will be convincing the world’s thinkers, policymakers, companies, and citizens of the imminence and overriding importance of this issue—that it is worth expending thought and political capital on this in comparison to the thousands of other issues that dominate the news every day. Then there will be a time for courage, for enough people to buck the prevailing trends and stand on principle, even in the face of threats to their economic interests and personal safety.

未来几年将艰难到令人难以想象,对我们的要求也会超出我们自认能够付出的程度。但在我担任研究人员、领导者和公民期间,我见识过足够多的勇气和高尚品格,因此相信我们能够胜出——当人类置身最黑暗的处境时,总能在仿佛最后一刻聚集起取胜所需的力量和智慧。我们没有时间可以浪费。

The years in front of us will be impossibly hard, asking more of us than we think we can give. But in my time as a researcher, leader, and citizen, I have seen enough courage and nobility to believe that we can win—that when put in the darkest circumstances, humanity has a way of gathering, seemingly at the last minute, the strength and wisdom needed to prevail. We have no time to lose.

作者注

37 我们最新模型 Claude Opus 4.5 的模型卡显示,在 Anthropic 经常采用的一项性能工程岗位面试中,Opus 的表现超过了公司历史上的所有面试者。

Our model card for Claude Opus 4.5, our most recent model, shows that Opus performs better on a performance engineering interview frequently given at Anthropic than any interviewee in the history of the company.

38 “编写所有代码”和“端到端完成软件工程师的工作”是两回事,因为软件工程师所做的远不止编写代码,还包括测试、处理环境、文件和安装、管理云端算力部署、对产品进行迭代等等。

“Writing all of the code” and “doing the task of a software engineer end to end” are very different things, because software engineers do much more than just write code, including testing, dealing with environments, files, and installation, managing cloud compute deployments, iterating on products, and much more.

39 计算机在某种意义上是通用的,但显然无法独自完成绝大多数人类认知活动,尽管它们在少数领域(例如算术)远胜人类。当然,构建在计算机之上的事物(例如 AI)如今已具备广泛的认知能力;这正是本文讨论的主题。

Computers are general in a sense, but are clearly incapable on their own of the vast majority of human cognitive abilities, even as they greatly exceed humans in a few areas (such as arithmetic). Of course, things built on top of computers, such as AI, are now capable of a wide range of cognitive abilities, which is what this essay is about.

40 需要说明的是,AI 模型的强项和弱项分布并不与人类完全相同。但它们在各个维度上的进步也相当均衡,因此,能力分布呈尖峰状或不均衡最终或许并不重要。

To be clear, AI models do not have precisely the same profile of strengths and weaknesses as humans. But they are also advancing fairly uniformly along every dimension, such that having a spiky or uneven profile may not ultimately matter.

41 不过,经济学家对这一观点仍有争论。

Though there is debate among economists about this idea.

42 个人财富是“存量”,GDP 则是“流量”,所以这并不是说洛克菲勒拥有美国经济总量的 2%。但要衡量一个国家的总财富,比衡量 GDP 更困难;而且个人年收入差异很大,因此很难用相同单位来计算两者的比例。将个人最大财富与 GDP 的比例作为基准,虽然不是同类相比,却仍是衡量极端财富集中的完全合理的指标。

Personal wealth is a “stock,” while GDP is a “flow,” so this isn’t a claim that Rockefeller owned 2% of the economic value in the United States. But it’s harder to measure the total wealth of a nation than the GDP, and people’s individual incomes vary a lot per year, so it’s hard to make a ratio in the same units. The ratio of the largest personal fortune to GDP, while not comparing apples to apples, is nevertheless a perfectly reasonable benchmark for extreme wealth concentration.

43 整个经济中的劳动价值每年为 60 万亿美元,因此每年 3 万亿美元相当于其中的 5%。即使劳动需求没有扩大(但由于成本下降,需求几乎肯定会扩大),一家以相当于雇用人类成本五分之一的价格提供劳动服务、并拥有 25% 市场份额的公司,就能赚到这笔钱。

The total value of labor across the economy is $60T/year, so $3T/year would correspond to 5% of this. That amount could be earned by a company that supplied labor for 20% of the cost of humans and had 25% market share, even if the demand for labor did not expand (which it almost certainly would due to the lower cost).

44 需要说明的是,我不认为 AI 的实际生产力目前已对美国经济增长作出显著贡献。我认为,数据中心支出所代表的是由预期性投资带来的增长:这相当于市场预期未来 AI 将推动经济增长,并据此投入资金。

To be clear, I do not think actual AI productivity is yet responsible for a substantial fraction of US economic growth. Rather, I think the datacenter spending represents growth caused by anticipatory investment that amounts to the market expecting future AI-driven economic growth and investing accordingly.

45 如果我们认同政府,我们会明确表示;我们会寻找共识点,也就是双方共同支持、且确实有益于世界的政策。我们的目标是做诚实的中间人,而非任何政党的支持者或反对者。

When we agree with the administration, we say so, and we look for points of agreement where mutually supported policies are genuinely good for the world. We are aiming to be honest brokers rather than backers or opponents of any given political party.

46 我认为,这种缓冲最多只能维持几年;时间再长一些,他们就会自己制造芯片。

I don’t think anything more than a few years is possible: on longer timescales, they will build their own chips.


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